Smartphone Wars

With the announcement of new models of iPhone and as a long time consumer of Apple products, I thought it was about time that I became acquainted with the market leader (in terms of numbers sold): The Android Phone.

Essentially smartphone buyers have two main choices: Buy Apple at a considerable premium and join Apple’s ecosystem with its walled garden approach to apps and services or buy an Android variant which, at the budget end, is considerably cheaper but is effectively locked in to Google’s world.

I have recently had the opportunity to use a Motorola Moto E 2nd gen 4G smartphone and pit it against my now nearly 3 year old iPhone 5. First impressions were good, really quite good. The 4.5 inch screen, a whole 0.5 inch bigger than my iPhone 5, was bright and clear and the phone responsive. Most of the apps I used on the iPhone were available in some form for the Moto E through Google Play and installed without fuss and worked well.

So clearly I had fallen into the trap of being an Apple fanboi and had been wasting my money all these years on keeping Apple’s shareholders happy. Google’s free operating system and the wizards at Motorola (now Lenovo) had produced a perfectly adequate phone for less than a quarter of the price I paid for my iPhone 5.

Or had I? As I started to become familiar with Android, I noticed a number of frustrating limitations which impacted on the user’s privacy and security.

Firstly, having read recently of Stagefright and other security vulnerabilities affecting smartphone OSs, I was keen to update my new Moto E with the latest Android 5.1 which would keep me safer. Trying to do so through the phone I was told that the installed OS 5.0.2 was up-to-date. Not so according to Motorola’s website which informed me that 5.1.1 was available for the Moto E, though the company’s chat support could offer no date as to when the update (first released in November 2014) would be available through OTA in the UK. Contrast this with Apple whose iPhone users update rate is much faster and easier.

Google themselves are reasonably quick at issuing updates for Android but the need for these to be tailored for the hundreds of handset variants and to get these to customers through manufacturers and often via carriers means that improvements can take many months to reach consumer’s phones if they ever do. What incentive is there for manufacturers/carriers to spend money on maintaining last year’s model when they can sell you this year’s?

Another frustration is the way Android handles app permissions. In iOS, permissions for things like notifications and location can be changed through Settings on an app by app basis. However in Android you are shown what permissions an app will demand on installation but are given no opportunity to change these through the OS either at install time or subsequently. Apps are available to allow tweaking of app permissions but these seem to be hard to use and unpredictable in outcome.

I tend to buy apps from different countries which may be restricted to local app stores. In iOS I can do this by having more than one iTunes account and switch between them as required. Not an ideal situation but manageable. However in Android, at least using Google Play, app availability seems to depend on location determined by IP address regardless of which Google account you are using. This means resorting to a VPN to spoof country of origin to just download regionally restricted apps.

So will I ditch my expensive addiction to Apple iPhones? Probably not yet while the competition seems to provide a product that shortchanges customer’s privacy and security.

The future of privacy in Australia after the data retention act

The future of privacy in Australia after the data retention act

Now that the data retention legislation has been passed into law, it is worth reflecting on what potential developments may result once it is active. The inadequacies of the bill have been discussed widely but a number of things stand out which may have a bearing on future developments.

The fact that the present law will not capture OTT traffic such as Gmail and Facebook significantly impacts on the efficacy of data retention. Senator Brandis believes that collecting data on some individuals (innocent citizens and dumb criminals in the most part) is better than none but when it becomes clear that this is not catching the terrorists/criminals, expect some significant tightening in this area.

Evidence based law has not been a strong point in the data retention debate so far and that is unlikely to change. The fact that mandatory data retention hasn't been proved effective is unlikely to stop its extension. It will only take another event involving serious political violence in Australia for the call to go out to widen the scope of data retention.

The UK exemplar may yet become the template for Australia. The Communications Data Bill (otherwise known as the Snoopers' Charter), first introduced in 2012, mandates retaining the browsing history of all UK residents. To date the UK parliament has not been convinced, however if a Conservative majority government is returned in the general election in May 2015, this legislation is slated to proceed unimpeded by the constraints of coalition with the Liberal Democrats who currently oppose the bill.

It is also interested to observe that both the ALP and UK Labour Party mooted data retention legislation when in office but got cold feet as elections approached. It would seem clear that in both countries only the minor parties (with some noble exceptions in the UK case) have the required technical competence and commitment to placing a high value on the privacy of the citizen.

So where do we go from here? I expect that citizens who value privacy online will take steps (either deliberately or incidentally) to minimize their exposure to data retention by using communications media which use OTT services. Privacy and surveillance are international in their reach and users will continue to demand that major providers like Apple and Google design their systems to be as immune to bulk surveillance as possible. There may be room in the mass market for new players. Surveillance by governments is international too (e.g. NSA and five eyes) and we can expect that the cat will continue to play with the mouse. The FBI for example is currently demanding that the US government insist the Apple create a backdoor in their encrypted iMessage service.

The implementation phase of the data retention act which translates the broad definitions (defined in the act) of data to be captured into actual instructions for ISPs would appear not to be open to public scrutiny so citizens may not be allowed to know the detail of the data being captured. The act however does make provision for citizens to request a report of their retained data although how granular this will be has yet to be seen. The opaque nature of the relationship between domestic law enforcement agencies and those charged with national security further blurs the picture when it comes to privacy.

Those requiring their communications to be private as part of professional privilege may need to adopt counter-surveillance methods to retain the privacy their clients expect and deserve. This will not only apply to journalists (the fig leaf provisions in the act offer no meaningful protection to journalists or their sources) but also to the law and medical professions. This will require a major change of mindset in these last two sectors which may not come about until sensitive data records are subject to court subpoena or when a data breach occurs.

The EU’s Court of Justice (CJEU) 2014 ruling on mandatory data retention gives some support to those who believe that this form of surveillance does not pass the proportionality test and should not form the basis of national legislation. The current UK DRIPA law which re-activates those aspects of mandatory data retention struck down by the CJEU ruling is currently being challenged in the UK High Court.

The rapid changes which come from the introduction of the internet have meant that in the short term at least, people have become accustomed to accepting less privacy. Law enforcement agencies need to do their job so absolute privacy is neither possible nor desirable. However privacy is a fundamental right, the loss of which will only be noticed once it's gone. Many believe that mass surveillance will eventually be seen as both ineffective and morally wrong. The question is how long will this take and what dangers do we face in the meantime?

Trying to get a perspective on all of this (and I haven't even mentioned corporate surveillance) can be hard but there many who seek to explain. One of the most respected of these is Bruce Schneier who in his recent book “Data and Goliath” examines privacy and surveillance in authoritative detail. It's aimed at a general audience and is well worth reading if you want to know more.

Here is a quote:

“Nevertheless, the threats of surveillance are real, and we’re not talking about them enough. Our response to all this creeping surveillance has largely been passive. We don’t think about the bargains we’re making, because they haven’t been laid out in front of us. Technological changes occur, and we accept them for the most part. It’s hard to blame us; the changes have been happening so fast that we haven’t really evaluated their effects or weighed their consequences. This is how we ended up in a surveillance society. The surveillance society snuck up on us.

It doesn’t have to be like this, but we have to take charge.”

Australian communications data retention legislation

Submission to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill

1. Introduction

Over the past several years Australian parliaments have considered how legislation should enable law enforcement and security agencies to do their work in a rapidly changing communications environment. At a time when there is a heightened awareness of threats from terrorism, it is important that legislators carefully consider any new laws intended to make us safer and not pass laws that threaten freedoms that up to now we have taken for granted.

In 2012 the previous administration sought views from the PJCIS regarding data retention, with proposals relying heavily on the EU Data Retention Directive as an exemplar. Since that time, the Court of Justice of the EU has found data retention undermines the right to privacy and therefore attempting to base Australian legislation using EU law as a template no longer presents such a convincing case.

In the 2012 enquiry many respondents had serious concerns regarding data retention. These concerns have not diminished; indeed with the better understanding today of the pervasiveness of metadata, these concerns are heightened.

In 2015 we are again considering mandating metadata retention with a Bill that I believe in its current form is essentially flawed.

• Blanket mandatory data retention will fundamentally change the relationship between the government and the citizen.
  
  
• The vulnerabilities introduced by data retention will damage the state of our national security and will make Australians MORE vulnerable and LESS secure.
  
  
• In adopting data retention, Australia will be ignoring the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection as exemplified by the recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU.
• The Bill does not adequately test the notion of proportionality in sacrificing the privacy of citizens in order to better detect criminality.
• It will be expensive and ineffective.

I am concerned because this Bill will mandate Carriage Service Providers to retain customer metadata for a period of 2 years. This will require them to create, collect and store metadata on all customers and make it available in near real-time to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and other bodies nominated by the A-G. This metadata is in excess of what communications providers currently store for commercial purposes.

Targeted communications surveillance, undertaken by LEAs via warrant, is a necessary and effective weapon in fighting serious crime including terrorism. However unwarranted blanket data retention is fraught with dangers and represents a step change in powers that citizens would be required cede to government.

The proposals outlined in the Bill lack proportionality and if enacted will sacrifice the privacy of all Australians for no commensurate and demonstrable improvement in the capacity to detect serious offences. The capture of metadata would in theory enable automated profiling of each citizen with a chilling effect on democracy and perceived freedom of expression. Parallels with Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon are all too real. We risk sleepwalking into a surveillance society.

There is a lack of clarity in the oversight and management of the retained data and indeed the metadata itself is not even defined but left to be prescribed by regulation.

Far from making us safer, data retention will make us more vulnerable. The Bill as currently drafted will give rise to many unintended consequences.

2. It's only metadata, it's not content

The average person will generate a significant amount of metadata each day which reveals a lot about their private lives. A bit like the front of an envelope analogy?

To give you an idea of how fatuous this distinction is, the embarrassing contents of your medical records are “content” and require a warrant, but the fact that you placed a call to a GP clinic on Monday, were emailed by a pathology lab on Wednesday, Googled for pharmacies near work, and then spent the next three days trying to Skype ex-girlfriends, is metadata – and doesn’t need a warrant.

With the proposed retention period of 2 years, the metadata will become a honeypot for civil litigants who may seek court orders. This could include family law and commercial disputes.

It has even been suggested (PwC questionnaire to Communications Alliance 24 Dec 2014) that CSPs could make commercial use of the metadata they collect.

The UN General Assembly 2014 report 'Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' makes this observation (s8.53):

By combining and aggregating information derived from communications data, it is possible to identify an individual’s location, associations and activities (see A/HRC/23/40, para. 15). In the absence of special safeguards, there is virtually no secret dimension of a person’s private life that would withstand close metadata analysis. Automated data-mining thus has a particularly corrosive effect on privacy.

3. Citizens not suspects

Mandatory blanket data retention is massive invasion of privacy and if enacted will fundamentally change the relationship between government and the citizen. It will have a chilling effect on democracy. We will all become suspects not citizens.

The idea that the government is entitled to watch all of us is fundamentally wrong. It is neither necessary nor proportionate in handling the challenges posed by terrorism and serious crime and I believe constitutes an unacceptable incursion into the civil liberties of each and every Australian.

The Bill makes no provision for the exception of professional privilege so that metadata associated with:

• lawyers and their clients
• doctors and their patients
• journalists and their contacts
• Members of Parliament and their correspondents

will be able to be collected, accessed and analyzed along with everything else.

The use of the UK's RIPA law by police to intercept journalists' phone records illustrates the problems of overreach that poorly drafted law can produce.

The Law Council of Australia does not support mandatory data retention.

4. Security

At present there are around 600 Carriage Service Providers (including ISPs and telcos) operating in Australia. The regime of data retention proposed by the Bill, with CSPs creating and maintaining their own individual databases, with the consequent lack of uniform security and vetting procedures, will inevitably result in the data being compromised at some point. It has been suggested that for cost reasons some CSPs may be compelled store the captured metadata on cloud services hosted overseas thus compounding the problem.

As evidenced by many recent well publicised examples, security breaches of this kind can have disastrous and unforeseen consequences.

Any Australian with a digital footprint (that's just about all of us) will potentially be at risk of attack from hostile groups or foreign nations. This Bill will create multiple targets for criminals to exploit stored metadata to undertake identity fraud, blackmail or just create chaos.

The vulnerabilities introduced by data retention will damage the state of our national security and will make Australians MORE vulnerable and LESS secure.

5. Effectiveness

Those who wish to circumvent the proposed law have the means to evade detection and will do so in increasing numbers if the Bill becomes law. This will inevitably result in reduced efficacy for targeted surveillance. As the Communications Alliance submission to the committee states:

“A recent search of the Apple Store, for example, revealed no fewer than 267 secure messaging applications on offer – each of which is readily obtainable and potentially able to remove the user from the reach of the proposed data retention regime.”

I understand that it is proposed that public WiFi hotspots will be exempted from the regulations thus further emasculating this ill-conceived legislation.

The US’s Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board found that there is little evidence that the metadata program has made the US safer.

The Bill assumes that all CSPs will be able to undertake the complex task of designing dynamic systems to retain a changing set of communications metadata, the details of which can be modified at any time by regulatory order. I believe most CSPs will be of the view that this will entail considerable ongoing effort (not being part of their core business) and come at a significant cost. Those drafting the Bill have given insufficient weight to this issue.

6. Data retention in the EU

In April 2014, the EU’s Court of Justice (CJEU) threw out a scheme equivalent to that proposed here, noting that metadata;

“...may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environment.”

Most EU countries with the exception of the UK have or are in the process of changing national laws to reflect this judgement. European policy makers will need to think twice before proposing any data retention or mass surveillance program in the future. (Laws recently passed in the UK expanding the use of data retention run the real risk of failing to comply with the 2002 EU privacy directive and have yet to be tested).

Australia is travelling in the opposite direction.

7. Surveillance tax

The government has indicated that they are prepared to recompense CSPs for a proportion of costs incurred in meeting the requirements of the Bill. Taxpayers will pick up the tab for this. Remaining costs will be borne by ISPs and telcos who will pass this on to consumers. In the popular mind this will be dubbed the Surveillance Tax when added to their monthly bill.

8. PJCIS Hearings

As I understand it the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security have been given until 27 February 2015 to report on the Bill. At its first public session on 17 December 2014, the A-G's department who is responsible for the passage of the Bill was still unable to provide a meaningful definition of the metadata to be captured by ISPs and telcos, without which no substantive estimates can be made regarding cost.

It is not clear whether either definitions or costing will be forthcoming before the JCIS is due to report at the end of February. How then will parliament be able to make an informed decision?

During evidence to the committee most of Australia’s law enforcement agencies were unable to say how many times phone and web data has been used to prevent serious crimes or terrorist attacks, or how many convictions resulted from requests.

The Bill proposes that the definition of metadata would be by regulatory instrument. This is vague and dangerous, with mission creep embedded in its mission statement. It is not good law.

9. Responsibility of parliament

When considering introducing laws which restrict freedoms in the name of national security, it is important that politicians do not pass knee-jerk legislation which they mistakenly believe will help the nation defend itself against terrorism and serious crime.

There are many laws already on the statue book which give LEAs the power to undertake targeted surveillance in pursuit of wrongdoers; there is little evidence to suggest that increasing the size of the haystack will result in the discovery of more needles.

Parliament needs to better test the question of proportionality before Australia embarks on a regime that will greatly erode the privacy of all Australians, introduce security vulnerabilities and impose significant costs.

The UN General Assembly 2014 report 'Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism' makes this observation (s7.51):

The related principle of proportionality involves balancing the extent of the intrusion into Internet privacy rights against the specific benefit accruing to investigations undertaken by a public authority in the public interest.

I do not see that a convincing case has been made to show that this balance has been struck.

Recent surveys have shown that 80% of respondents ‘disapprove of the Australian Government being able to access their phone and internet records without a warrant’. I do not believe that, once acquainted with the facts, the great proportion of the Australian electorate will accept the unwarranted mass surveillance implicit in this Bill.

Brian Ridgway

Are we witnessing the end of broadcast TV?

Back in the days when broadcast television first saw the light of day (in 1936) there was no alternative but to disseminate programs using the electromagnetic spectrum. This meant powerful transmitters were deployed allow TV receivers within their range to receive programs using an antenna.

Frequencies above about 30MHz were considered at the time less useful than lower frequencies as they were generally less able to be reflected by the ionosphere and therefore travel long distances. So broadcasters were able to use these frequencies without any other services competing for spectrum. In the UK the 405 line transmissions were first broadcast on channel 1 which had a vision carrier frequency of 45MHz.

As television expanded in the 1950s, spectrum was set aside for TV broadcasters exclusive use and occupied channels in what was known as Band I (41 - 66 MHz) and Band III (176 - 211 MHz). The 5MHz wide channels used for 405 line transmissions (8MHz for 625 line) could easily be accommodated by these carrier frequencies.

At the time the spectrum that was allocated to TV broadcasters was considered to be at the boundaries of what receiver technology could achieve (remember - using thermionic valves) and was not hotly contested by other potential users. Broadcasters were able in the most part to claim the spectrum for nothing, paying no fees to government.

As the number of TV channels increased in the 1960s and 70s many countries started using Bands IV and V (470 - 862 MHz). The use of valuable spectrum for analog TV in such a way was not seen as inefficient at the time as it allowed most countries such as the UK and Australia to provide 5 national TV channels with minimal co-channel interference.

In the 1970s television programming began to be distributed to the home via satellite, first using analog technology and later digital. Offering a wide range of programming (particularly sport) it has remained popular since that time, particularly for those living in remote areas beyond the reach of terrestrial transmissions. Along with its counterpart, cable TV, it offers programming mainly on a subscription basis.

Such was the state of affairs in the cosy analog days of the 1950s to 2000s. But things were about to change first with digitization and advent of the mobile phone and later, the internet.

Digital terrestrial TV (DTTV) launched in the UK in 1998 and has subsequently replaced its analog counterpart in many countries resulting in a potential increase in the number of channels available to the viewer from 5 to over 100 (but sadly nowhere near 100 in Australia). At the same time spectrum use has been reduced.

Hooray for efficiency you may say. But the celebration (and terrestrial digital status quo) may prove to be short-lived.

Just as many countries are switching off their analog channels and converting to digital, there is more pressure on the valuable spectrum they use (gratis) from the demands of mobile services who have to pay serious money for the right to use spectrum. It turns out that the very frequencies used by DTTV are ideal for the provision of mobile services as they use antennas that can be comfortably accommodated in mobile devices and have a wavelength that can penetrate buildings relatively easily.

There are other factors at play that may well accelerate the move away from broadcast as the way of disseminating TV programs. As the bandwidth available to domestic internet users increases, the capability of video streaming in higher definitions also increases. When 50 or 100 Mb/s connections delivered by fibre to the home are commonplace, then multiple high definition video streams will be possible.

In the meantime (as at 2013) most homes in countries with at least an ADSL connection can receive video streaming at acceptable quality. This has allowed the creation of highly popular ‘catch-up’ services such as BBC iPlayer and ABC’s iView that allow users to view programs that have recently been broadcast on conventional broadcast channels.

This means that viewers can escape the tyranny of the broadcast schedule in a way more convenient than formerly possible through the use of VCRs (using magnetic tape) and DVRs (digital video recorders).
These ‘catch-up’ services herald a much more dramatic change to the television industry.

BBC Global iPlayer already offers limited programming from the massive BBC TV archive on a subscription basis for viewers in certain markets outside the UK. They are constrained in offering a wider range of content because of re-transmission rights negotiated with incumbent broadcasters in markets such as Australia.

Once the potential income from selling direct to the customer becomes significant, this will put pressure on long-held commercial arrangements with incumbent broadcasters such as ABC Australia. We will then see an inevitable decline in overseas product shown through conventional broadcasters.

In the non-public sector, players such as Netflix are commissioning big budget drama series such as ‘House of Cards’ for exclusive distribution through their subscription video streaming service. All episodes of a series are available simultaneously, freeing the consumer from the weekly episode paradigm so loved by conventional broadcasters.

So what will all this mean for the future of broadcast TV? Well there is one element missing in the path to digital consumption nirvana - ironically the TV itself. The typical TV setup in most homes is a hotch-potch of terrestrial, DVD/ Blueray player, DVR, cable, satellite etc. The addition of internet delivered TV via unappealing ‘smart’ apps on the TV itself or through yet another box with its own remote control cannot be a compelling prospect. The companies that provide an integrated solution and easy navigation of internet-provided programming will move things in the right direction and may prove pivotal.

The other major issue which will face those companies who seek to offer internet delivered TV is that of global distribution. The notion of making content available to different regions on a timetable set by the rights holders has been blown apart by the easy availability of pirated material. Viewers often have no alternative but illegal downloading when program providers can’t or won’t make their content available in a particular local market.

Issues of content rights, technical infrastructure and local representation all have to be resolved if rights holders want to minimize revenue leak through piracy. This will probably take many years to fully resolve.

Well what does this impending change mean to ‘conventional’ broadcasters? Players such as the BBC who already have a global presence are likely to transform themselves into world-wide providers of programming direct to consumers, most likely by subscription.

This may influence the way in which the BBC is funded for domestic programming so expect some tricky political footwork here. Some commercial networks such as Fox and HBO will no doubt do the same. I’m sure new players such as Netflix and others (don’t forget Apple Amazon and Google) will prosper in this new environment.

Once these changes become entrenched will we see conventional linear broadcast TV reduced to covering 'real-time' events such as News and Sport - or eventually disappear altogether? Maybe all 'TV' as we currently call it will be delivered over the internet whether over broadband fibre to the home as well as wirelessly to mobile devices.

Smaller players including Australian TV broadcasters face challenging times that could see the demise of some. The ABC will need to redirect its programming to focus on what nobody else may be able to provide - Australian content - if it is to remain relevant in this new world.

Draft Communications Data Bill (UK)

This draft bill is currently under review by a UK parliamentary joint committee. They have given about a six week window for public comment - here is my submission:

The powers proposed under the bill are neither necessary nor proportionate and will do little to curb the activities of criminals and terrorists as they will always seek ways to avoid surveillance. Storing the communications data of everyone will make us a nation of suspects and will fundamentally change the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The UK is as far as I am aware the only democratic country in the world proposing to gather communications data in this way; similar attempts by other countries such as Germany have been ruled unconstitutional.

The widespread use of services provided through the internet means that even the communications data of individuals reveals much more about their lives (e.g. which websites you have visited, financial institutions accessed etc) than the details of phone calls previously required to be held by CSPs. This information can reveal a lot about a person: their health, their hobbies and their political and business interests. Perspectives on what communications data it is acceptable to retain must clearly be refocused in an age when internet use is so pervasive.

A multiplicity of databases held and managed by private companies, containing ‘communications data’ presents a significantly increased risk of security breaches. So citizens will not only be subject to their communications data being intercepted without any warrant process but also at increased risk of this sensitive data being accessed by criminal or foreign interests.

The underlying technology required to support the proposals detailed in the draft bill needs to be more explicitly stated so that proper scrutiny can be made as to potential issues that might arise in its use.

The requirement for Request Filters outlined in the draft bill is so broadly worded that it would allow data mining of all the communications data collected and encourage 'fishing trips'. Non of this would require a warrant.

The need to achieve the right balance between maintaining the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and upholding civil liberties is a critical issue and needs the utmost scrutiny by Parliament.

The draft bill in its present form falls short in so many areas that it needs completely redrafting to better reflect the balance of the legitimate needs of the security and intelligence services and the privacy of the citizen.

I urge the joint committee to recommend a redrafting of this bill to reflect the concerns raised in the hearings and in this consultation process.

e-Books

Are e-books the next thing in publishing which will wipe out the centuries old legacy of Gutenberg or just the latest fad? I suspect that both media formats will be jostling for their own particular sweet-spot in the future world of the printed word. I have recently bought a Kindle e-book reader so I can find out for myself. You can read the review I wrote soon after I received my new toy here.

Soundscapes

On a more recreational note I am intrigued by the British Library’s UK Sound Map project which is is a new community-led survey-in-sound of the acoustic landscape of Britain. I have been using my iPhone to record and post acoustic samples of public spaces in the UK and elsewhere on my Audioboo account, the mobile and web platform that allows you to upload geo-located and tagged sounds with accompanying pictures to share with others.

Privacy

One of the areas that is facing particular challenge as the fourth communication revolution unfolds is privacy. While users of social networking sites can suffer privacy infringements, it is the capacity (which has increased dramatically in recent years) for businesses and governments to accumulate personal data that presents the most serious challenge, I believe.

Whether it is Google Street View vehicles collecting data from unsecured Wi-Fi connections or governments apparently intent on collecting more and more personal data often without the individual’s knowledge, privacy is under threat as never before.

The UK Coalition Government’s recent  policy reversals on medical Summary Care Records and the Orwellian sounding Interception Modernisation Programme are just two areas of government policy that should sound a warning to those who value privacy.

The Australian government’s recent proposal for data retention of phone calls and internet traffic will also need to be exposed to detailed public scrutiny before we can be sure that individuals’ privacy is not compromised.

The Fourth Revolution

As John Man writes in his excellent book on Johannes Gutenberg, there are four distinct turning points on the road from grunt to e-mail: the invention of writing, the invention of the alphabet, the invention of movable type and printing and the fourth revolution - the invention of the internet.

It is the social and political as well as technical aspects of this fourth revolution which started having widespread impact in the mid 1990s that attracts my interest. Since I became aware of the internet in around 1992 and my early work on what in retrospect were rather primitive websites in 1994, I can only be grateful to be alive at a time of such intense change. I wonder how Johannes Gutenberg would feel?

With two billion people having access to the internet worldwide (in 2010) and rapidly rising, we are only at the start of a revolution which is likely to have an influence on our society in ways that we cannot yet predict.

Meanwhile the political world grapples with the impact of the internet on copyright and surveillance (to name but two of the current political hot potatoes). In the wider public arena societal issues such as privacy and how we archive an increasingly digital world will need to be considered as part of how we operate as a society.

There is plenty to think about as we ride the roller-coaster of the fourth communication revolution.